Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties to grow a shared key which they can use for unconditionally secure communication [1] . The applicable distance of a QKD protocol depends on the loss and the excess noise of the connecting quantum channel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Several QKD schemes based on coherent states and continuous variable (CV) measurements are resilient to high loss in the channel, but strongly affected by small amounts of channel excess noise [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties to grow a shared key which they can use for unconditionally secure communication [1] . The applicable distance of a QKD protocol depends on the loss and the excess noise of the connecting quantum channel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Several QKD schemes based on coherent states and continuous variable (CV) measurements are resilient to high loss in the channel, but strongly affected by small amounts of channel excess noise [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
Here we propose and experimentally address a CV QKD protocol which uses fragile squeezed states combined with a large coherent modulation to greatly enhance the robustness to channel noise. As a proof of principle we experimentally demonstrate that the resulting QKD protocol can tolerate more noise than the benchmark set by the ideal CV coherent state protocol. Our scheme represents a very promising avenue for extending the distance for which secure communication is possible.
A generic CV QKD protocol between two trusted parties, commonly called Alice and Bob, is initiated by Alice who prepares a distribution of Gaussian quantum states of light e.g. coherent [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] or squeezed states [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Alice transmits the states through a quantum channel to Bob who performs measurements on the continuous quadrature components of the light field using either a homodyne detector [2] [3] [4] [5] or a heterodyne detector [6] thus measuring conjugate quadratures either randomly or simultaneously, respectively. This results in a set of data which is partially correlated with Alice's data set which she obtained in the process of preparing the distribution of quantum states. Alternatively, a two-way quantum communication scheme can be formulated [9] , but we will restrict our discussion to one-way quantum communication. To estimate the secrecy of the transmission, Alice and Bob compare a subset of their data using classical communication. Provided that the security threshold for channel loss and excess noise has not been violated the resulting set of raw data can then be mapped onto a shared secret key using classical post-processing * Electronic address: lsma@fysik.dtu.dk † Electronic address: usenko@optics.upol.cz techniques [1, 4, 16] . Alice prepares a conditionally squeezed state by randomly measuring the amplitude or the phase quadratures of one mode of an EPR state using a homodyne detector. The conditionally squeezed state is modulated further by a modulator (Mod) fed with a Gaussian white noise (WN) source controlled by Alice. The homodyne data and the white noise data are stored for signal processing (SP) and the gain between them is optimized. The modulated conditionally squeezed state is transmitted through an untrusted quantum channel where Eve is allowed to perform any attack that mimics the channel transmission η and the channel excess noise . After the channel Bob performs quadrature measurements using a homodyne detector and the classical post-processing can begin.
In our scheme we prepare a Gaussian distribution of nonclassical states using the method illustrated in Fig.  1 . Alice prepares a Gaussian two-mode squeezed state, known as an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state (with variance V EP R ), and measures one of the modes using a homodyne detector that randomly detects the amplitude or the phase quadrature. This measurement projects the EPR state onto a Gaussian distribution of conditionally squeezed states [17] . The Gaussian distribution is further enlarged in phase space by a controlled modulation using two random and independent Gaussian variables. The final Gaussian distribution of states is then transmitted through a potentially lossy and noisy quantum channel the action of which may be ascribed to an eavesdropper (Eve). Finally, the states are measured by Bob who randomly measures one of the two conjugate continuous quadratures using homodyne detection.
After the transmission Alice holds two sets of data; one set obtained from the homodyne measurements, {x HD }, and one from the Gaussian modulation, {x M }. The two sets are weighted with an optimized gain factor, g, and subsequently added to yield the optimized set: x M + gx HD . The optimal gain factor depends on the arXiv:1110.5522v1 [quant-ph] 25 Oct 2011
FIG. 2: Theoretical comparison between the performance of different CV QKD protocols. a) Secret key rate as a function of distance (corresponding to a loss of 0.2 dB per km) for a fixed excess noise of 0.1 SNU. 1) Ideal Coherent state protocol with 100 SNU modulation. 2) Squeezed state protocol with 3 dB squeezing (without additional modulation). 3) Squeezed state protocol with 10 dB squeezing (without additional modulation). 4) Our proposed protocol with 3 dB squeezing and 100 SNU modulation. 5) Our proposed protocol with 10 dB squeezing and 100 SNU modulation. For all protocols, the added noise to Bob's data is optimized. b) Maximal tolerable channel noise versus the initial antisqueezed variance. The channel loss is set to 10 dB (corresponding to a distance of 50 km). 1) Ideal coherent state protocol with asymptotically large modulation. 2) Squeezed state protocol without additional modulation. 3) New combined squeezed state protocol with100 SNU of coherent modulation without the gain. 4) Our Proposed optimized protocol with 100 SNU coherent modulation and optimized gain factor. For all protocols, the added noise to Bob's data is optimized.
variance of the EPR state and for pure states it is given by g = V 2 EP R − 1/V EP R . We see that in the limit of no squeezing (corresponding to V EP R = 1), Alice only keeps the data from the Gaussian modulation and thus the protocol reduces to the standard coherent state protocol [2, 3] . In the limit of very strong squeezing (corresponding to V EP R 1), the values of the resulting data set are equally constructed by the homodyne measurement outcomes and the Gaussian modulation, and in that case the protocol performs like the squeezed state protocol suggested in Refs. [10] [11] [12] . However, in a real life scenario squeezing is limited and thus an intermediate gain will optimize the generation of a secret key. The rest of the classical part of the protocol follows the common recipe of the generic protocols.
To prove the security of our CV QKD protocol, it is sufficient to consider the class of collective attacks as they have been shown to be optimal under certain symmetries of the protocol [18] [19] [20] [21] . For collective attacks and using the classical technique of reverse reconciliation [3] , the achievable key rate (in the asymptotic limit of an infinitely long raw key and for perfect classical postprocessing) is given by
where I AB is the Shannon mutual information between the data of Alice and Bob, and χ BE is the Holevo bound on the information available between Bob and Eve [22] . To use this general framework for the calculations of the key rate, it is necessary to define a theoretical preparation scheme [23, 24, 29] where the actual twomode state of Alice and Bob is part of a higher mode pure state [25] . This purification is generated by using pure sources and accounting for all modes. For example, the standard prepare-and-measure coherent state or squeezed state protocols are often treated theoretically by an equivalent entanglement based protocol. In the present work, the actual setup is already entanglement based however the resulting states are impure due to imperfections in the squeezing sources and the imposed modulations. We therefore define a theoretical preparation scheme (see Fig. 3 ) that can generate any two-mode Gaussian state between Alice and Bob as part of a pure four-mode state (see methods).
To reach large distances for which key distribution can be attained, one must develop a protocol that maximizes the key rate in Eq. (1). We start by considering the standard coherent state protocol. It is known that the key rate for this protocol can be maximized by using an infinitely large Gaussian modulation and by adding white noise to Bobs data which are obtained by homodyne detection [10] . Using the above mentioned analysis for collective attacks, we calculate the secure key rate and the maximally tolerable excess noise, and the results are illustrated by the solid curves in Fig. 2 a) and b) . These two curves represent the coherent state benchmarks. Employing the squeezed state protocol suggested in ref. [10] these benchmarks can be beaten but only for strongly squeezed states as illustrated by the dotted curves in Fig.  2 a) and b).
Now by considering our protocol ( Fig. 1) , the key rate and the tolerable excess noise are increased even further as shown by the bold dashed lines Fig. 2 . Our protocol has the remarkable property that any degree of squeezing improves the performance beyond the optimized coherent state protocol. Moreover, another important feature of our protocol is that the squeezed states need not be pure, is pure, while the six free parameters can be set so that the two modes A and B can simulate any Gaussian two-mode state (up to a local unitary transformation) including the states produced in our experimental setup. One mode of the state is measured by an ideal detector at Alice while the other travels through the channel which has transmission η and excess noise . Finally Bob's noisy detection is purified by placing a beamsplitter with an EPR input and a transmission mimicking his electronic noise, detection efficiency and the noise he adds to his data, before an ideal detector.
only the importance of the gain factor is reduced. Therefore, practically realizable squeezed state sources can be used to improve real life CVQKD implementations. The significance of weighting the measurement outcomes at Alices station is illustrated by the dot-dashed curve in Fig. 2b which represents the protocol with g = 1 (that is, with no weighting corresponding to highly impure squeezed states). The experiment was carried out using the setup sketched in Fig. 4 . We start by generating EPR entanglement [17] between two modes of light. The quadrature of one of the EPR modes is measured by means of high efficiency homodyne detection at Alice's station. In addition to the measurement, we induce a random but known coherent modulation to the second EPR mode. After the channel we measure the second mode using a high efficiency homodyne detector at Bob's station, to access either the amplitude quadrature or the phase quadrature. We use laser light at 1064 nm for the seeds and local oscillators and 532 nm for the pump for the Optical Parametric Oscillators (OPOs). The EPR state has 3.5 dB ±0.2 dB of two-mode squeezing and 8.2 dB ±0.2 dB of antisqueezing and the coherent modulation depth is sequentially varied between 0 and 15 db. All measurements are performed at the sideband frequency of 4.9 MHz with a bandwidth of 90 kHz. The experiment was carried out sequentially for conjugate quadratures; the amplitude quadrature was first conditionally squeezed, displaced and measured, and the procedure was then repeated for the phase quadrature. We add the homodyne and modulation data with an optimized gain. This results in two large data strings, one for Alice and one for Bob which are strongly correlated as shown for three different modulation depths in Fig. 5 a1) homodyne detector while the other mode interferes on a highly asymmetrical beamsplitter with a coherently modulated auxilliary state. The auxiliary state is generated using a phase modulator (PM) and an amplitude modulator (AM), each of which are driven by a white noise generator. Alice acquires information about the modulation by measuring a part of the auxiliary state. The coherent state is purified [29] by the highly asymmetric beamsplitter giving Alice a signal to noise ratio of 20-25 dB on the coherent part of the modulation that enters the channel. The modulated and conditionally squeezed state is transmitted through the channel to Bob's homodyne detector where one of the conjugate quadratures is measured. The resulting measurement outcomes are fed via a fast AD card to a computer for signal processing.
entanglement and partly from the coherent modulation. From the correlated data we compute the covariance matrices as illustrated in Fig. 5 b1)-b3) , from which we can estimate the security limits for our system (see methods).
In the laboratory the channel transmission is 95% and the excess noise can be continuously varied by unbalancing the generated data at Alice and Bob. As an example we set the excess noise to 0.45 shot noise units (SNU) and the total modulation depth to 23.4 SNU. For these settings of the experiment we generate a raw key with a rate of 0.004 ± 0.001 bit per state. For comparison, we note that neither the coherent state based protocols nor the standard squeezed state based protocol (with 3.5 dB squeezing) could have generated a key in such a channel.
We now investigate the security performance of our protocol in longer channels based on the experimentally measured covariance matrices. The matrices are used in a model that includes the known and trusted losses and noise sources and in which arbitrary channel loss and excess noise can be simulated. As an example we assume a channel transmission of 10% and find the tolerable excess noise for six different realizations of the covariance matrices illustrated on The red points represent the normalized and weighted quadrature data of Alice and Bob for three different depths of coherent modulation 1) 0 SNU, 2) 3.6 SNU and 3) 23.8 SNU all having 3.6 SNU modulation from the EPR source. These correlated data are contrasted with a set of uncorrelated data points (green) with identical total energy. Solid black ellipse and outer circle correspond to two standard deviations of these two respectively, inner blue circle is two standard deviations of shot noise. b1-3) Illustrations of the covariance matrices for the three modulation depths. c) Tolerable excess noise as a function of the modulation depth for a simulated transmission of η = 0.1. The bars represent the actual measurements with compensation for 85 ± 5% quantum detection efficiency as the dominating source of uncertainty. The theoretical estimates for the ideal coherent state protocol and our protocol with the experimental parameters are given by the solid and dashed curves, respectively. For comparison, we also include the performance of the coherent state protocol with an energy identical to the energy of the two-mode squeezing protocol. d) The maximally tolerable loss as a function of the channel excess noise. The thick dashed line is for the state presented in matrix b3), the solid curve is for the ideal coherent state protocol and the dotted curve corresponds to the two-mode squeezing protocol without additional modulation presented in matrix b1).
tolerable noise associated with the experimentally realized covariance matrix in Fig. 5 b3) . We clearly see that by combining squeezed states with coherent modulation we beat the performance of any coherent state protocol (limited to the shaded region).
We have introduced and experimentally addressed a QKD protocol based on continuous variable squeezed states of light. Interestingly, we find that the key rate as well as the robustness against channel noise is improved for any degree of squeezing compared to the idealized and optimized coherent state protocol. The requirement on the purity of the squeezed states is relaxed, thus rendering the protocol provable secure against any type of attack on the channel. In fact, by using strongly squeezed but also highly impure states such as those produced via the large bandwidth Kerr effect in standard optical fibers (where up to 6.8 dB of squeezing and 29.6 dB of anti-squeezing has been produced [26] ) the coherent modulation is left unnecessary. In future commercial implementations miniaturized waveguide cavities could be used to make on chip squeezed state QKD [27] . Finally, we note that in the present work we have assumed perfect classical postprocessing. However, it can be shown that squeezed states are even more beneficial if imperfect post-processing is taken into account [28] ; such protocols will be studied in the future.
Methods Summary

Theory of the protocol
Here we describe how to calculate the necessary quantities for estimating the security thresholds of the proposed protocol.
The Shannon mutual information, being the first part of the lower bound on the key rate (1), is calculated directly from Bobs variance, V B , and Bobs variance conditioned on Alices measurement, V B|A , as
The Holevo quantity gives an upper bound to the information available to Eve. It is expressed through the von Neumann entropies (S(·)) as χ BE = S(ρ E ) − S(ρ x B E ) in the reverse reconciliation scheme, where ρ E is the density matrix of Eve's states and ρ x B E is the same conditioned by Bob's measurement. Assuming that Eve caused all the loss and the excess noise of the channel, she purifies the system of Alice and Bob so that S(ρ E ) = S(ρ AB ) and S(ρ
AB ) whereρ AB is the pure state shared between Alice and Bob. Thus, in order to calculate the Holevo quantity we need to purify the two-mode state of Alice and Bob. When all the modes are known and symmetric Alices source can easily be purified analytically. In the general case when only the mode structure is unknown but the source covariance matrix is known it can still be purified using the Bloch-Messiah reduction [25] shown in Fig. 3 . At Bobs side we simulate the detection efficiency and add trusted excess noise similarly to the method used in reference [10] . The von Neumann entropies are then calculated from the symplectic eigenvalues of the respective covariance matrices.
A. Experimental data security analysis
The measurement and the subsequent data processing (including gain g optimization) resulted in the set of covariance matrices for different values of modulation. The security analysis was performed, according to the purification method. For each of the measured covariance matrices the 4-mode pure state (ABCD on Fig. 3 ) was constructed and used to calculate the Holevo quantity and resulting lower bound on secure key rate.
In parallel, the theoretical estimation of the expected protocol performance was calculated from the experimental parameters of our setup. The covariance matrices were constructed from the experimentally measured EPR states. All the respective transmittances and efficiencies were applied in both EPR modes (as beamsplitter transformations) and the coherent modulation was perfectly added on top. The resulting covariance matrices were tested in the proposed optimized QKD protocol upon given channel transmittance and excess noise. The corresponding theoretical curve is shown in Fig. 5 C) .
I. METHODS FULL Theory of the protocol
In this this section we show in detail how to calculate the necessary quantities for estimating the security thresholds of the proposed protocol.
The Shannon information, being the first part of the lower bound on the key rate (1), is calculated directly from the variances of the channel output, prior to and conditioned on the measurements of Alice. The covariance matrix before the channel has the form
where γ A and γ B are individual mode matrices, and σ AB is their correlation matrix. In particular, taking into account optimal entangled state preparation from orthogonally squeezed states with squeezing V 0 and excess antisqueezing noise ∆V 0 , weight g, applied to homodyne measurements, and additional coherent modulation of variance ∆V , we obtain:
where I is the identity matrix. Similarly, the correlation matrix is
where σ z is the Pauli matrix and
After the channel characterized by the transmission η and the excess noise Bob's mode is given by
and the covariance with Alice is given by
The mutual Shannon information is then given by
The Holevo quantity is expressed through the von Neumann entropies of the state ρ E , which is available to Eve and the same state ρ
x B E , conditioned by Bob's measurement (in the reverse reconciliation scenario), then
E ), where S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy of the respective state.
In the conditions of lossy and noisy channel, we assume, that Eve is able to purify the state, shared between Alice and Bob, thus S(ρ E ) = S(ρ AB ) and, similarly, after Bob's projective measurement with outcome x B the conditional entropy is S(ρ
A ) [4] , whereρ AB is the pure state, shared between Alice and Bob, andρ
A is the same state conditioned by Bob. Then the von Neumann entropies are calculated from symplectic eigenvalues λ i of the respective covariance matrices, describing a state ρ as
where n is the number of modes and G(x) = (x + 1) log 2 x + 1 − x log 2 x.
Thus, in order to calculate the Holevo quantity we need to purify the two-mode state, described by the covariance matrix (2) .
For the theoretical estimate we do so, by emulating coherent modulation as coupling to a strong two-mode entangled state on the strongly unbalanced beamsplitters and emulating weight factor, applied to homodyne measurement, as coupling to a strongly squeezed vacuum state (the squeezing direction is the same, as measured by Alice). The resulting 5-mode stateρ AB = ρ ABCDF is pure (in case, when Bob's trusted detection noise is considered, two more entangled modes should be added to purify the overall 7-mode state) so is the conditional stateρ
ACDF and the excess auxiallary modes can be trusted. The calculation of respective covariance matrix γ ABCDF is then straightforward using the beamsplitter transformations. The covariance matrix of the state ρ ACDF |B conditioned by Bob's measurement x B is given by [4] 
where γ ACDF is the submatrix of matrix γ ABCDF (describing the state ρ ABCDF ), which corresponds to modes A, C, D and F and their correlations, while σ x B ACDF is submatrix of γ ABCDF , describing the correlations between mode B and modes A, C, D and F . Matrix X is 2 × 2 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements {1, 0}, and M P stands for Moore-Penrose inverse. The corresponding eigenvalues of matrices γ ABCDF and γ x B ACDF can be then calculated numerically and give the resulting Holevo quantity and the final lower bound on the secure key rate (1) .
For the experimental estimate we have to use the general scheme. The measured covariance matrix is of the form
where each of the V 's and C's have the measured values.
To purify this matrix we imagine it to be mode A and B of the pure 4-mode state shown on Fig. 3 . The general 4-mode covariance is of the form
, where
and similarly for other elements of the matrix (10).
Here we denoted s 1(2) = exp r 1(2) ;
Where r 1(2) is the r-parameter of squeezer 1 (2), V 1(2) is the EPR variance of EPR source 1 (2) and T 1(2) is the transmittance of beamsplitter 1 (2) all on shown on Fig. 3 . Now the proper parameters of the purification r 1 , r 2 , V 1 , V 2 , T 1 , T 2 can be found from the set of 6 equations. Then the matrix (10), constructed from the obtained parameters, will correspond to the 4-mode purification of the arbitrary 2-mode state, described by the initial matrix (9) , while submatrix of modes 1, 2 of the matrix (10) will exactly coincide with the initial matrix (9) . Finally the symplectic eigenvalues of purified state (10) can be used to calculate the Holevo quantity.
A. Experimental setup details
Our light source is an Innolight Diabolo laser producing light at 1064 nm and 532 nm. Both beams are sent through high finesse triangular mode cleaning cavities for temporal and spatial mode cleaning. The mode at 532 nm is used as the pump for the optical parametric oscillators (OPOs) whereas the mode at 1064 nm serves as a lock beam for the OPOs, auxilliary beam for the modulation channel and as local oscillators (LOs) for the homodyne detection systems. The OPOs are 25 cm long bowtie shaped cavities with two curved dichromatic mirrors (with 25 mm radius of curvature and highly reflective at 1064 nm) and two plane mirrors; one with a highly reflective coating and another one with a reflectivity of 8% for OPO1 and 10% for OPO2. This yields cavity bandwidths of around 21 MHz and 24 MHz. The nonlinear crystals inside the OPOs are temperature controlled type I periodically poled KTP crystals which are phase matched for down conversion at the specified wavelenghts. Each of the crystals is pumped with 170 mW of the 532 nm beam, which means that the OPOs are operating well below threshold. A small part of the squeezed output beam is tapped of and used for locking the phase of the pump to deamplification thereby generating amplitude squeezed sidebands. The states measured directly have 4.9 dB and 4.1 dB of shot noise reduction along the squeezed quadratures and 8.3 dB of increased noise along the conjugate quadratures. When coupling these two squeezed seeds we measure an EPR state with 3.5 dB two-mode squeezing and 8.2 dB of antisqueezing. The total homodyne detection efficiency is 90% ± 5% at Alice and 85% ± 5% at Bob. The signal is mixed down and low passed with a 90 kHz filter before it is digitalized with a sampling rate of 500 kHz. Each data block consists of around 200.000 points.
